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Abstract: Private international law doctrines are often portrayed as natural, largely immutable, 
boundaries on local public agency in a transnational private world. Challenging this 
problematic conception requires a reimagining of the field, not only as a species of public law 
or an instrument of governance, but as a constitutional phenomenon. This paper investigates 
what such a ‘constitution of the conflict of laws’ could look like. Two features are given special 
emphasis. First: the idea of the conflict of laws as an independent source of constitutionalist 
normativity, rather than as a mere passive receptacle for constraints imposed by classical, 
liberal, constitutional law. And second: the possibility of a local, ‘outward-looking’ form of 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The project for this paper is to bring constitutionalist concerns to bear on the 
question of the relationship between private international law and global 
governance. A turn to constitutionalism is a familiar – and by no means 
unproblematic – move in times of crises of legitimacy. Against such a background, 
appealing to constitutionalist ideas in relation to contemporary transnational 
private law emerges as an attempt to restoratively invoke some form of ‘the public’ 
in the face of increasing threats of private hegemony.1 Alternatives for such a 
move might include turns to public international law, to the more managerial and 
technocratic forms of global administrative law and global governance, or to 
hybrid forms like ‘transnational public policy’. It is not immediately obvious, 
however, what invoking constitutionalism, specifically, could mean in relation to a 
highly fragmented, pluralist, transnational private sphere. What, more in particular, 
might ‘the constitutional’ mean in relation to ‘the private international’, and vice-
versa?  
In some of its guises, that question is hardly new. There is a voluminous 
literature on the influence of constitutional law on private international law, or the 
conflict of laws, notably in federal systems, like the United States, or in the semi-
federal setting of the European Union. But these familiar connections leave a 
whole range of other questions unexplored. Does private international law, as a 
legal field, have a constitution? Could private international law be a constitution? 
And: Can we conceive of a distinctive form of conflict-of-laws constitutionalism? It 
is this less familiar range of questions that is addressed in this this paper.  
I advance two specific arguments. One relates to the question of whether 
private international law has a constitution – and a distinctive constitutionalism to 
go with it. This argument starts with conventional understandings of the 
relationship between constitutional law and private international law. I suggest that 
these conceptions are curiously limited in that they tend to focus merely on the 
commands and constraints classical constitutional law imposes on the conflict of 
laws. That approach, however, leaves unexamined the idea of the conflict of laws 
as an independent source of constitutionalist normativity, to complement or 
correct classical liberal - state - constitutionalism. I also suggest, though only in 
outline in the context of this paper, that inspiration for the content of such a 
private international constitutionalism could be sought by way of analogy with 
conceptions of ‘sectorial’ constitutionalisms, like an environmental- or a labour 
constitutionalism.   
                                                     
1 This sphere encompasses the traditional legal fields of private international law – in conjunction with 
elements of domestic- and uniform substantive private law – as well as those of international commercial 
arbitration, of the area commonly designated as ‘transnational private regulation’, and at least parts of 
international investment arbitration. The terms private international law and conflict of laws are used here 
as synonyms. 
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The other argument relates to the question of whether private international 
law could be a constitution – or part of a constitution – for the transnational 
private sphere. Here again, I start with classic accounts of the constitutional law / 
conflict of laws relationship and note that they tend to emphasize the role 
conflicts doctrines play within federal systems. Conflict of laws, on these views, 
emerges as an application of federalist principles with regard to private law. In this 
paper, by contrast, I try to show how this inwardly focused federalist conception 
needs to be complemented by an outward-looking, local conflicts 
constitutionalism. The vocation of such a local conflicts constitutionalism could 
be to strengthen private international law as a site for deliberation and contestation 
over the identity and boundaries of polities. Such strengthening, I argue, is an 
urgent project for a field that has long been seen as imposing natural constraints 
on local public agency in a transnational private world. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II discusses the way in which 
private international doctrine naturalizes limits to local public agency, using the 
example of early attempts to regulate road safety. The idea of the constitutional, in 
this Section, emerges first as the idea of the constituted: that which is not natural 
and inevitable, but subject to choice and innovation. Section III presents a brief 
overview of conventional ways of mapping the relationship between private 
international law and constitutional law, as a common background to the two 
main arguments set out above. Section IV takes up the topic of private 
international law as a constitution. The constitution of the conflict of laws, in this 
sense, is presented as a hybrid phenomenon, operating on both global and local 
levels, simultaneously constituting a transnational sphere of private autonomy and 
multiple local spheres of public agency. Sections V and VI then discuss the idea of 
a constitutionalism for the conflict of laws. The first of these Sections makes the 
case for a local, as opposed to a federal, form of constitutionalism, while the 
second turns to sectorial analogies as sources of inspiration for the substantive 




II. THE NATURAL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL  
 
The assertion that private international law doctrine naturalizes the boundaries of 
what is possible in the regulation of private law relations across borders relies as 
much on an understanding of a pervasive disciplinary mood as it does on legal 
technicalities.2 It is to heighten sensitivity to this mood, and to show the possibility 
of alternatives, that this Section begins with this brief historical account of 
disruptive technological advance and legal response.  
Just over a century ago, a visionary entrepreneur packaged a radically new 
form of individual freedom into ‘the simplest designs that modern engineering 
                                                     
2 One of the effects of this mood is precisely to present such questions of possibility and impossibility as 
– mere – juridical technicalities. 
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[could] devise’. Within a matter of years, these freedom machines had become an 
‘almost necessary instrument in modern life’. They had transformed traditional 
notions of space, of the home, of romance even. And they were well on their way 
to killing over 20.000 people in the United States a year, injuring many tens of 
thousands more.3  
This was the landscape American state legislatures were confronted with by 
the early 1920s, when they sought to regulate the use of cars on their roads. Many 
of these early laws were challenged, and upheld, in the courts.4 One problem, 
though, was especially difficult to solve: that of protecting persons and property 
within a state against injuries caused by transient non-residents. This was, as one 
contemporary writer helpfully explained, ‘due to the speed of the automobile, 
which not only tends to cause accidents but also affords the operator an 
opportunity to escape from the place in which the accident happened’.5 A 
Supreme Court judgment of the time lists the obstacles to simple civil damages 
actions, thrown up by the governing legal framework: 
 
The process of a court in one state cannot run into another and summon a 
party there domiciled to respond to proceedings against him. Notice sent 
outside the state to a non-resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an 
action against him personally for money recovery. There must be actual service 
within the state of notice upon him or upon someone authorized to accept 
service for him. A personal judgment rendered against a nonresident [sic], 
who has neither been served with process nor appeared in the suit, is without 
validity. The mere transaction of business in a state by nonresident natural 
persons does not imply consent to be bound by the process of its courts.6 
 
Nearly a hundred years later, while many of the technical doctrines have changed, 
this still sounds surprisingly familiar as a description of current thinking about 
regulating private law relations beyond state borders. Then, by the early 1920s, the 
US Supreme Court had been insisting for around fifty years on a framework of 
strict territoriality and state sovereignty that prevented courts from taking 
jurisdiction in civil damages cases over defendants not served within the forum.7 
With out-of-state service unthinkable, hapless injured citizens, it seemed, would 
simply have to hope that their alleged tortfeasors would one day drive by again. 
Modern businesses, much like these early drivers, also routinely manage to escape 
the reach of local regulations. One major reason for this is the fact that the 
                                                     
3 Cf. Ford, My Life and Work (1924), p. 73; Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Motorists, 39 HARV. L. REV. 
563, 565 (1925). 
4 See e.g. USSC Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924) (New York statute requiring posting of security or 
insurance to pay for damages in case of death or injury not so burdensome as to amount to a 
confiscation). 
5 Scott (1925), p. 565. 
6 USSC Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 355 (1927) (emphases added). 
7 The classic authority is USSC Penoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
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principle of party autonomy – in jurisdiction, choice of law, and commercial 
arbitration – has for at least the past half century enjoyed essentially the same 
unquestioned status occupied earlier, and still, by territoriality and sovereignty.8  
At first sight, then, these are two equally defeatist accounts of limits to the 
capacity of local communities to regulate hazardous trans-local private activity. In 
both, the idea of such local regulation emerges not merely as something that might 
be difficult to achieve, but rather as something that, in juridical terms, simply 
cannot be done. The earlier story, however, comes with a twist. In the face of the 
legal constraints listed above, several state legislatures adopted innovative statutory 
provisions to enable their courts to take jurisdiction over out-of-state drivers. Use 
of a state’s highways by a non-resident, these new rules stipulated, would simply 
be deemed equivalent to the appointment of a state official – the registrar of 
motor vehicles – as agent on whom process could be served within the 
jurisdiction.9 In a 1927 decision, Hess v. Pawloski, the US Supreme Court held that 
these provisions on service did not violate the Due Process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment to the US Constitution. Motor vehicles were dangerous 
machines, the Court noted, and states could make and enforce ‘regulations 
reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and 
nonresidents alike’, who used their highways. Even though these statutes implied 
consent in a rather spectacularly fictitious fashion, and even though they treated 
non-resident defendants less favourably than residents, they had to be seen as such 
reasonable and necessary measures.10 
Contemporary transnational private law shows very little of the assertive spirit 
on such remarkable display in Hess v. Pawloski and in the statutes it upheld. The 
dominant mood in fields like private international law and international 
commercial arbitration, and in theorizing on modern forms of lex mercatoria, rather 
embraces the idea of stringent limits to state authority in a post-state world. That 
mood is sustained both by sociological accounts of the overburdening of state law 
and politics under conditions of extreme, globalized functional differentiation, and 
by law-and-economics inspired attacks on the inefficiencies of public regulation.11  
                                                     
8 See e.g. Rühl, Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of Contracts, in Gottschalk, Michaels, Rühl, von 
Hein (eds.), CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 158 
(party autonomy ‘not seriously called into question on either side of the Atlantic’); Perez, Normative 
Creativity and Global Legal Pluralism: Reflections on the Democratic Critique of Transnational Law, 10 IND. J. GLOB. 
LEG. STUD. 25, 41 (2003) (New York 1958 Arbitration Convention as the basis for a ‘space of non-
interference’); Muir Watt, Private International Law beyond the Schism, 2 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 347 
(2011); Muir Watt, Le principe d’autonomie entre libéralisme et néolibéralisme, in Fallon, Lagarde, Poillot-
Peruzzetto (eds), LA MATIÈRE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE, SOCLE D’UN CODE EUROPÉEN DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ? (Dalloz, 2009). 
9 See e.g. 90, General Laws of Massachusetts, as amended by Stat. 1923, c. 431, § 2. 
10 274 U.S. 352, 356.  
11 See e.g. Sand, Polycontextuality as an Alternative to Constitutionalism, in Joerges, Sand, Teubner, 
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM (Hart, 2004), p. 64; Teubner, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION (Oxford University 
Press, 2012); Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 317, 320 (2002). The politics of 
these accounts tend to be diametrical opposites. See e.g. Zumbansen, Defining the Space of Transnational 
Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance, and Legal Pluralism, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305, 310 
(2012).  
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In this environment, private international law doctrines in particular play a 
crucial, but often unnoticed, role in facilitating an understanding of state 
regulation as constrained by natural boundaries.12 The literature on transnational 
private regulation, to the extent that it sees local public law as significant at all, 
regularly brings this out very clearly. In a typical account, state courts ‘have 
enforcement powers that are geographically limited’. The state’s domestic 
regulatory competencies ‘do not extend readily into the transnational realm’, and 
domestic courts cannot easily intervene ‘unless a link under private international 
law grants jurisdiction to them’.13 The point is not that such statements are 
inaccurate, and that these ‘jurisdictional obstacles’ somehow do not exist. The 
argument is rather that in these accounts such ‘obstacles’ are naturalized. While 
virtually all other elements of the legal process are seen as potential objects of, and 
instruments for, regulatory innovation, the required ‘link under private 
international law’ commonly appears in this literature as a given. Limits on 
jurisdiction, almost boundless party autonomy, strict obligations to enforce arbitral 
awards, the near-impossibility to give effect to even the most important elements 
of the legislation of another country (if that country does not supply the otherwise 
applicable law); all of these are simply part of the world of transnational law and 
litigation as it is and always will be. 
My argument is this: If we want to challenge these narrow conceptions of 
what is normal, exceptional, and impossible in contemporary private international 
law, we will need to do more than merely re-imagine the field as an object and 
instrument of regulation or governance, as a species of public law, or as a forum 
for politics.14 Such a challenge demands, in addition, an understanding of private 
international law as a constitutional phenomenon. This argument is based in part 
on what Gunther Teubner has recently called the fallacy of the ‘constitutional 
emptiness of the transnational’.15 Numerous social subsystems in the transnational 
sphere, Teubner notes, already have constitutions, at least in the sociological sense 
of reflexive mechanisms by which they secure their own autonomy. But what is 
striking about these ‘constitutions of global functional regimes’, and in particular 
about the constitutions of global markets, is how in recent decades they have 
exclusively pursued - and have been allowed to pursue - the one-sided aim of 
achieving autonomy for their social subsystem.16 Along the way, Teubner argues, 
                                                     
12 Muir Watt (2012), p. 382; Bomhoff & Meuwese, The Meta-Regulation of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 
JOURNAL OF L. & SOC. 138 (2011).  
13 Verbruggen, Gorillas in the closet? Public and private actors in the enforcement of transnational private regulation, 7 
REGULATION & GOVERNANCE (2013), p. 512 (internal references omitted). 
14 See, e.g., Muir Watt (2012) (on politics); Mills, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge University Press, 2009) (on the public/private divide); Bomhoff & 
Meuwese (2011) (on regulatory perspectives). 
15 Teubner (2012), p. 7. The argument in this paper does not, I think, depend on acceptance of all 
elements of Teubner’s theory of societal constitutionalism. 
16 Teubner (2012), pp. 76-77. 
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attention to constitutionalism’s crucial second function, of (self)-limitation, has 
been lost.17  
Private international law has so far been largely complicit in this unbalanced 
quest for transnational autonomy, enabling the creation of informal, private 
empire that now threatens to overwhelm local agency.18 But my central claim in 
this paper is that this same field, when seen through a constitutionalism lens, also 
holds untapped potential for recalibration. Such a rebalancing would of course 
have to be more than simply a more aggressive approach to unilateral, local, public 
regulation of transnational private activity.19 On this point, too, Hess v. Pawloski is 
instructive. There, the extension of jurisdiction went hand in hand with careful 
attention to due process concerns and questions of equal treatment.20 Along 
similar lines, the vocation of a constitution of the conflict of laws could be to 
enhance the capacities of private international law as a site for deliberation and 
contestation over the character and boundaries of the identities and 
responsibilities of polities.21 As Karen Knop has argued, much of this turns on 
merely excavating lines of thought and doctrine already present in private 
international law. The field exhibits striking histories of, both, an ‘actually existing 




III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL:  
MAPPING RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Conventional understandings of the relationship between constitutional law and 
private international law run in two main directions. At first sight at least, these are 
strikingly different. 
                                                     
17 Ibid., calling this a process of worldwide ‘neo-liberal’ constitutionalization. 
18 Muir Watt (2012), pp. 381-382 (‘It is to a large extent through the denials of their private international 
law that states have been complicit in the development of the informal empire that now threatens to 
overwhelm them’). 
19 Cf. Muir Watt & Bureau, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ (Presses Universitaires de France, 2010), Vol. 
I, p. 31. Attention to the interests of outsiders to state democratic processes lies at the heart of the 
invocation of conflict-of-laws methods in the work of Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl. For the claim 
that unilateral regulation of transnational business is inherent in the concept of the rule of law, see 
Francq, L’APPLICABILITE DU DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE DERIVE AU REGARD DES METHODES DU DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (Bruylant/LGDJ, 2005), pp. 577-640.  
20 The court found that ‘literal and precise equality’ between residents and non-resident drivers was not 
necessary or even possible. It was enough that the statutes did not impose any ‘hostile discrimination’ and 
that they safeguarded the rights of defense by requiring subsequent notice at the defendant’s home 
address. 
21 See, e.g., Wai, In the Name of the International: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Internationalist 
Transformation of Canadian Private International Law, 39 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 117, 122 (2001) (aiming for a 
‘richer discourse about international public policy in the development of […] private international law’, in 
the form of ‘an approach that rejects both naïve internationalism and naïve anti-internationalism’). 
22 Knop, Citizenship, Public and Private, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 309, 311, 341 (2008) (emphasis 
added). 
                           4/2014 
 
 8
On the one hand, constitutional law and private international law are natural 
allies in many federal systems, with the United States, Canada, and Australia as the 
best-known examples. But that immediate intuitive connection comes with some 
complications. For one, the ways in which the two fields are seen as related show 
significant differences, not only between these systems but also over time. The 
very familiarity of the connection may also hinder the examination of questions 
that are not part of any local conflict-of-laws / constitutional law canon.23 Finally, 
and related, it is worth noting that, from among these examples, both Canadian 
and Australian jurisprudence have been influenced by the work of Albert Venn 
Dicey, in both constitutional law and conflict of laws. Dicey’s conception of the 
nature of sovereignty, and his strict separation between public and private law, as 
Campbell McLachlan has recently noted, have left much of the common law 
world ‘relatively underprepared to adopt a coherent approach to the extraterritorial 
rights and duties of states in the present century’.24 And it is precisely such 
questions on extraterritorial rights and duties that a conflicts constitutionalism in 
the sense intended here would have to address.  
On the other hand, the private international / constitutional law connection 
is radically at odds with some basic tenets of private international law in the 
European continental tradition shaped largely by Savigny. But here too, the picture 
is more complicated. In part, this is because EU law and ECHR human rights law 
have wrought profound changes in European private international law over the 
past three decades. Those changes have reinforced the field’s public dimensions, 
although, troublingly, not necessarily also its constitutional foundations. European 
private international law, then, is in the midst of a longer process of 
transformation, with potentially profound consequences.  
Taking a step back from these two contingent institutional and historical 
settings, the relationship between constitutional law and private international law 
can be conceived from at least three more abstract basic angles.  
On a first view, private international law is simply one among many fields of 
law impacted by constitutional norms. This, to a large extent, is the classic topic of 
the constitution and private international law. The constitutional norms in question 
could be those of a local unit - a state or province, for example - or, more 
typically, those of an overarching federal, or semi-federal, structure. Among the 
familiar instances of this type of connection are the debates in the US in the early 
1930s, when it appeared to some as if the conflict of laws was about to become a 
                                                     
23 Cf. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 623 (2006); Henkin, The Constitution as 
Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 11 (1985) 
(referring to questions on the rights of aliens, on the status of immigrants, and on ‘the applicability of the 
Constitution to persons outside the United States’, as lying away from ‘the paths commonly trodden by 
students of the United States Constitution’).  
24 McLachlan, The Allocative Function of Foreign Relations Law, BRITISH Y.B. INT’L L. 349, 356 (2013). US 
constitutional jurisprudence shows a similar inward focus, traceable at least in part to textual silence in the 
Federal Constitution and in the Bill of Rights in relation to the rights of outsiders and the extraterritorial 
projection of governmental authority. 
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mere ‘branch of constitutional law’.25 Another example would be the 
programmatic statement by the Supreme Court of Canada, in Morguard v. De Savoye, 
that ‘the rules of […] private international law […] must be shaped to conform to 
the federal structure of the constitution’.26 From a conflicts perspective, this first 
angle is modest in that it portrays private international law as a mostly passive 
receptacle - a mere tool - for constitutional demands.27  
A second, and from a conflicts perspective more ambitious, familiar 
conception sees private international law as actively fulfilling constitutional 
functions. This is the idea of private international law as constitutional law. That 
idea has found recognition, for example, in the Supreme Court of Canada’s vision 
of the ‘confluence of private international law and constitutional law’. Under this 
label, the Court affirmed its view that ‘coordination in the face of diversity is a 
common function of both public and private international law […] [and] also one 
of the major objectives of the division of powers […] in a federation’.28 
On a third view, finally, the relationship between the two fields is reversed. 
From this angle, it is constitutional law that emerges as a form of conflict of laws. 
This type of approach most frequently takes up the form of an analogy, as, for 
example, in Ralf Michaels’ claim that ‘[t]he country-of-origin principle in EU law is 
best understood by analogising it to the vested-rights theory in private 
international law’.29 Other influential examples would include Christian Joerges’ 
conception of EU law as a form of ‘conflicts law’, inspired by American conflict-
of-laws theories, and Gunther Teubner and Andreas Fischer-Lescano’s analysis of 
‘regime collisions’, elaborated more recently by Gunther Teubner in the form of a 
‘global constitutional conflict of laws’.30  
These, then, are three abstract conceptions of normative hierarchy: of the 
conflict of laws as a mere tool for the effectuation of constitutional demands, of 
conflict of laws and constitutional law as co-equal sources of constitutionalist 
normativity, and of the conflict of laws as itself a source of inspiration or template 
for constitutionalism. These three views cannot, of course, be kept strictly separate 
in practice. Many further forms of combination of private international law and 
constitutional law are conceivable.31 And it would in any event be an illusion to 
                                                     
25 See, e.g., Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 706, 706 (1963). 
26 [1990] 3 SCR 1077, 1101. 
27 See also, e.g., Mills (2009), p. 204 (two-step model for the relationship between choice of law and EU 
law, in which EU law operates in a ‘separate “second stage” to affect the application or modify the 
content of the applicable law’). 
28 SCC Hunt .v T&N plc, [1993] 4 SCR 289, 296.  
29 Michaels, EU Law as Private International Law? Reconceptualising the Country-of-Origin Principle as Vested-Rights 
Theory, 2 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 195, 199 (2006). 
30 See, e.g., Joerges, The Idea of a Three-Dimensional Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form, in Joerges & 
Petersmann, CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW (2nd ed., Hart, 2011), p. 413; Teubner & Fischer-Lescano, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal 
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004); Teubner (2012), p. 13. These 
approaches are in many ways very different, but nothing turns on these differences here. 
31 See, e.g., Fawcett, The Impact of Article 6(1) of the ECHR on Private International Law, 56 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 1, 24, 36 (2007) (using human rights law to ‘cast light on the meaning’ of key PIL concepts, or a 
two-stage, ‘hybrid’ approach of using human rights law to identify human rights problems, and PIL 
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think that it will always be possible, in judicial or scholarly legal reasoning, to 
identify exactly from within which field of law any particular normative argument 
originates.32 The point of this typology is merely this: to show how in the 
relationship between constitutional and private international legal thought, both 
fields – and not just the constitutional – can be a source of a type of normativity 
that, as will be argued below, is best seen as a form of constitutionalism. The 
content, or even the presence, of this constitutionalism is rarely made explicit. But 
especially in the second and third scenarios outlined above, where private 
international law plays an independent constitutional role, or is taken to inspire 
constitutional norms, some form of constitutionalist normativity from within 
private international law must be at work, even if it commonly remains 
unacknowledged. A more practical way of putting this point is to say that merely 
studying legal materials that come under the traditional heading of ‘constitutional 
law’ does not give a complete picture of what constitutionalism, even in its 
classical sense, is about – private international law is part of the constitutional 
framework that allocates and limits public authority under law. But if that is true, 
then private international law has to be seen as itself also the source of a type of 
normativity best seen as constitutionalist in character.  
One example of how difficult it often is to unearth this particular kind of 
normativity can be found in Lord Bingham’s speech in the English case of Lubbe v. 
Cape. This case concerned a very large number of personal injury claims against an 
English company engaged in asbestos mining in South Africa brought in England, 
by former workers at the mine. It was common ground before the English court 
that the claimants would not be able to have their cases heard in the South African 
courts, as it would be prohibitively expensive to proceed without legal aid, which 
would not be available there. Such financial aid could, however, be obtained for 
trial in England. At issue was the question of whether, and if so how, this fact 
should play a role in the English court’s forum non conveniens analysis. Having 
reached the conclusion that the case should proceed in England, Lord Bingham 
summed up his position on the relationship between human rights law and private 
international law by stating ‘I do not think article 6 [of the ECHR] supports any 
conclusion which is not already reached on application of [the conventional, 
English conflict of laws] Spiliada principles’.33 Putting private international law 
norms ‘first’ in this way, as James Fawcett has noted, ‘gives the impression that 
                                                                                                                                       
doctrines to solve them); Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185, 185 
(1976) (constitutional limits on choice of law in the US as ‘[a] discrete body of Supreme Court case law 
that has been generally ignored by constitutional law experts’). 
32 On the relationship between private international law and constitutional law, see also more recently 
SCC Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, par. 22ff (search for ‘conflicts rules that would accord 
with the constitutional imperative’ – closer to the first scenario in the typology developed here – but also 
noting that the ‘real and substantial connection test’ ‘was born as a general organizing principle of the 
conflict of laws. Its constitutional dimension appeared only later’ – which is closer to the second 
scenario). 
33 Cited in Fawcett (2007), p. 10. 
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these rules deal with the human rights concern’.34 If that impression is right - and 
Lord Bingham certainly seemed to think it was right - then the idea that private 
international law does indeed ‘deal with’ human rights concerns must imply some 
broader underlying normative vision, proper to the field itself, speaking to 
individual rights and state responsibilities. In Lubbe v. Cape, for example, that 
vision would have to ‘deal with’ the responsibility to provide a venue for tort 
litigation, for at least certain types of personal injury cases, in at least some types 
of cases where alternative venues are not available. It is these aspirations and 
commitments located within private international law itself that will be referred to 




IV. THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AS A CONSTITUTION 
 
One meaning of the phrase ‘the constitution of the conflict of laws’ is the idea of 
private international law as a constitution. But how are we to imagine such a 
constitution? What, in particular, would such a conflicts constitution constitute?  
This question is perhaps best addressed, at least provisionally, by way of 
reference to some of the classic oppositions in private international legal thinking, 
in particular those between local and international, and between public and 
private.35 If the conflict of laws, as a field of law, straddles these basic oppositions 
then there is every reason to assume that its constitution will do so too.36 The 
constitution of the conflict of laws would then emerge as a hybrid phenomenon. It 
could be understood, from a first angle, in a top-down sense, as a form of 
constitutional law on a global level. Pervasive fragmentation and differentiation at 
this global level, however, would mean that this constitutional law appears as a 
‘global constitutional conflict of laws’:37 a collection of principles, techniques and 
vocabularies pertaining to the ordering of regulatory authority and responsibility in 
a global or regional setting. The constitution of the conflict of laws, on this first 
partial view, would then refer to that part of this constitutional conflict of laws 
that deals predominantly with private law relations. From a second, bottom-up, 
point of view, the constitution of the conflict of laws could refer to that part of 
any local – state, federal or regional – constitutional law having any bearing on 
private law relations that cross the boundaries of that locality.38  
                                                     
34 Ibid. 
35 See, among many other examples, Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government 
Responsibility, 26 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1994). 
36 Not simply transcend: A constitution of the conflict of laws would constitute these very oppositions to 
begin with. 
37 Cf. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner (2004); Teubner (2012), p. 13. This conception could also work at a 
sub-global, regional level. 
38 A useful analogy here is the field of ‘foreign relations law’ in the US, which operates as a ‘sophisticated 
amalgam of public international law doctrine with the relevant principles of municipal constitutional law’. 
See McLachlan (2013), p. 373 (emphasis added). 
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From both these vantage points, what the constitution of the conflict of laws 
constitutes is, simultaneously, a trans-local sphere for private legal autonomy and 
numerous local spheres of public authority. In normative terms, this constitution 
should serve to uphold private autonomy beyond the local, while at the same time 
preventing this trans-local private sphere from overreaching. And it should 
function to enable effective local public authority over trans-local matters, while 




V.  A CONSTITUTIONALISM FOR THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (I): 
BEYOND FEDERALISM 
 
The two perspectives outlined in the previous Section are very different in where 
they direct their normative gaze, and from what standpoint. One starts at the local, 
or municipal, level and then looks outward; the other starts from the ‘supra-local’ 
to look inward, or downward. Only the second of these two perspectives is 
commonly associated with constitutionalism. That association is typically formed 
within federal systems.40 Conflicts norms, on this view, operate as secondary rules, 
or ‘meta-norms’, of constitutional ordering at this federal level.41 They fulfil an 
architectural function, allocating regulatory authority by curbing local parochialism 
and imperialism from the centre, and by limiting public authority by way of 
individual rights.42 
This exclusively ‘federal’ reading of the relationship between conflict of laws 
and constitutional law, however, is problematic. Not just on its own terms, but 
especially also because it misses out on much of the constitutionalist potential 
within private international law. This alternative reading will be called the ‘local’ 
view of conflicts constitutionalism.  
A useful way to begin the project of exploring the contours of this local 
conflicts constitutionalism is to look in some detail at some of the difficulties 
attending the – more familiar – federal reading. In this respect, the US context 
furnishes some revealing examples. To begin with, it is not clear why profound 
differences exist in the degrees to which the major fields of US conflict of laws 
doctrine are constitutionalized. As is well known, states’ jurisdiction to adjudicate 
is subject to stringent federal constitutional limitations. But modern choice of law 
is left largely free of such constraints. With regard more specifically to 
                                                     
39 This topic is more complex than this preliminary sketch can do justice to. Such a constitution would, 
for example, also play a role in constituting not just component units or a system, but a ‘whole’ legal 
world. See Lindahl, Finding a Place for Freedom, Security and Justice: The European Union’s Claim to Territorial 
Unity, EUR. L. REV. 29 (2004), p. 470. 
40 Or on the international level by way of federalism-analogy. See Mills (2009) for discussion. 
41 Mills (2009), p. 124. 
42 See, e.g., Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 34-41 (1946). 
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constitutional limits on jurisdiction, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Nicastro clearly demonstrates how unsettled some of the most fundamental 
doctrines remain, even when applied to fairly basic factual scenarios.43 In the field 
of choice of law, the US constitution imposes rather fewer limitations, as 
mentioned above, but the foundation and justification of these limitations remains 
highly uncertain.44 The meaning and relative significance in particular of the Full 
Faith and Credit clause and the Due Process clause, is not clear. Supreme Court 
case law is inconsistent in whether it relies on the one rather than on the other 
clause, or on both in conjunction. The Justices have at times seen the 
requirements of the two clauses as identical.45 But that view has long been 
contested in scholarly literature, and in any event sits uneasily with the very 
different historical backgrounds of the two provisions,46 and with the contrast 
between the types of relationships that they appear to address – between states 
and individuals (Due Process) and between states inter se (Full Faith and Credit).47 
Most importantly, the two provisions are at least very different in that Full Faith 
and Credit cannot apply to extra-federal relations, whereas Due Process can and 
does. This difference too casts doubts on their purported equivalence in intra-
federal cases. 
The purpose of this Section is not to rehearse these and other well-known 
difficulties. The point is merely to suggest that some of them may actually stem in 
part from the exclusive reliance on a federal vision, to the detriment of any 
alternative ‘local’ conception of conflicts constitutionalism. For that project the 
relationship between Full Faith and Credit and Due Process is particularly 
interesting. Crucially: in contrast to the Full Faith and Credit clause, the Due 
Process clause also applies in extra-federal cases – that is: cases involving 
defendants established outside the US. This difference in scope strongly suggests 
that some other underlying principles other than mere federal ‘architectural’ 
concerns must be at work. Those other principles remain obscured, however, 
                                                     
43 USSC J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Robert Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011). 
44 See, e.g., Jackson, Full Faith and Credit: The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 
(1945) (‘I think it difficult to point to any field in which the [Supreme] Court has more completely 
demonstrated or more candidly confessed the lack of guiding standards of a legal character than in trying 
to determine what choice of law is required by the Constitution’). 
45 See, e.g., USSC Sun Oil v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988). For discussion, see Brilmayer, Goldsmith, 
O’Hara O’Conor, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed., Wolters Kluwer, 2011), p. 342 
(‘Wortman must surely make one thing even clearer: that with regard to the issue of whether an adequate 
nexus exists for the application of local law, the due process and full faith and credit limits are identical’). 
46 See, e.g., the debate between Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185 
(1976), and Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94 
(1976). 
47 Similar confusion reigns in the field of constitutional limitations on jurisdiction, where the status of 
federalist principles is highly uncertain. See, e.g., USSC Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de 
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (‘The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. [the leading decision in this area] […], must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty 
interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction 
requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns’) (emphases added). Of course, the 
‘liberty interest’ referred to here, still operates as a right granted at the federal level, limiting the authority 
of local constituent units. But, and this is the crucial point, that changes in extra-federal cases, where the 
federal level becomes the local, relative to the outside world. 
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whenever the two clauses are treated as equivalent. But in addition, even Full Faith 
and Credit itself – ostensibly the purest expression of the federal role of the 
conflict of laws – does not appear to be animated solely by federalist concerns. A 
number of American territories already had very similar statutory provisions even 
before the Continental Congress.48 And the Full Faith and Credit clause as 
adopted at the Constitutional Convention of 1789 was itself largely derived from a 
provision in the Articles of Confederation of 1777 (Article IV).49 These earlier 
provisions too suggest that some other normative concerns, unrelated – or at most 
weakly related – to principles of federal architecture must also be in play.  
One classic article on Full Faith and Credit is especially revealing on this 
specific issue. Why, Robert Jackson asked in 1945, did the practical impact of this 
clause seem so limited? His answer: ‘Generosity in applying foreign law no doubt 
has forestalled pursuit of many questions as constitutional ones under the full faith 
and credit clause’.50 This ‘generosity’ stemmed in part from the fact that the 
judiciaries of the several states had ‘voluntarily accepted as part of their own 
common law the principles of the Conflict of Laws’.51 In these passages, Jackson 
draws a clear contrast between constitutional questions on the one hand, and 
common law conflict of laws questions on the other; and between generosity at 
the state level on one side, and federally imposed constraints on the other. But this 
distinction leaves some crucial questions unanswered. Where does the courts’ 
vaunted ‘generosity’ come from? If the application of ‘foreign’ law by state courts 
is a constitutional issue when mandated by the Full Faith and Credit clause, then 
why would this same legal operation, by those same courts, cease to be a 
constitutional issue when apparently based on their ‘generosity’? 
A local, outward looking, conception of conflicts constitutionalism would not 
draw such deep distinctions between the recognition of foreign norms on the basis 
of ‘comity’, ‘enlightened self-interest’ or the ‘mutual convenience of nations’ on 
the one hand,52 and questions of constitutional obligation on the other. From such 
a local perspective, all legal relations with the outside world would implicate 
constitutional concerns.  
There clearly are antecedents for this type of local constitutionalist thinking in 
American private international law thinking - to stay with that example - notably in 
the work of Joseph Story. ‘[E]very nation must judge for itself’, Story wrote, ‘what 
is its true duty in the administration of justice’.53 ‘[W]hatever force and obligation 
                                                     
48 Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts: A Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. 
L. REV. 33 (1957). 
49 Jackson (1945), pp. 3ff. 
50 Ibid., p. 18. 
51 Ibid., p. 17. 
52 Ibid., p. 30. See also Story, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, 1834), 
par. 278. 
53 Story (1834), par. 34. Story also refers to the more familiar principles of ‘mutual interest and utility […] 
the inconveniences which would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral necessity to do 
justice, in order that justice may be done to us in return’ (par. 35). 
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the laws of one country have in another, depends solely upon the laws, and 
municipal regulations of the latter, that is to say, upon its own proper 
jurisprudence and polity.’54 And Story’s work contains numerous further hints at 
the importance of some local form of normativity in conflict of laws doctrine of 
the time. These include: the irrelevance of a party’s foreign nationality in 
commercial law; the idea that domestic substantive constitutional norms, like the 
protection of private property, would be weakened without adequate conflicts 
rules to cover cross-border situations; and the need for uniformity with other 
branches of the law concerning assertions of public authority in situations 
transcending the boundaries of the polity.55 
Notwithstanding traces like these, the idea of a local, constitutionalist 
normativity is clearly a marginal one in classical conflicts thinking. In the classical 
view, state sovereignty, and the attendant exclusion of the foreign, is a 
constitutional matter. The recognition of foreign norms and interests appears only 
as an exception – in a sense: as the negation of sovereignty and of the constitutional, 
and thus merely as an expression of ‘comity’ or some related, equally unsatisfying, 
but distinctly not constitutional, principle. Surely, though, if the assertion of local 
authority is a constitutional matter, then so too is declining to assert that authority, 
in favour of a foreign norm or decision.56 Both assertion and forbearance bear 
equally on the boundaries of a polity, and on the formation of its identity. A very 
similar blind spot appears in more modern theories of law beyond states that look 
to notions of democracy rather than of sovereignty. ‘Precisely because 
democracies enact laws that are supposed to bind those who legitimately authorize 
them’, Seyla Benhabib summarizes these views, ‘the scope of democratic 
legitimacy cannot extend beyond the demos which has circumscribed itself as a 
people upon a given territory’.57 True enough. But while it is widely recognized 
that within polities, democracy is incomplete without attention to constitutionalist 
concerns, such as those pertaining to the protection of minorities, the idea that, 
similarly, it is only reasonable to demand that the external projection of public 
authority pass through the constraints and exhortations of constitutionalism, is 





                                                     
54 Story (1834), par. 21. 
55 Story (1834), paras. 281, 4, 21. See also par. 3 (‘enlarged sense of national duty’). Reading the irrelevance 
of foreign nationality in commercial cases, and the relevance of (local) nationality in the pursuit of crimes 
committed abroad both as manifestations of a local conflicts constitutionalism of course only involves an 
apparent contradiction. 
56 It was his acute awareness of this very point that informed Brainerd Currie’s lex-fori solution for cases 
of true conflict. 
57 Benhabib, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS (Cambridge University Press, 
2004), p. 219. 
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VI. A CONSTITUTIONALISM FOR THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (II): 
‘SECTORIAL’ INSPIRATION 
 
How best to understand such a local form of conflicts constitutionalism? If we 
reject both traditional public international law, comity-based, perspectives and the 
federalist constitutional architecture view, how do we avoid the dangers of, on the 
one hand, the excessive parochialism of the unquestioned assertion of local law, 
and on the other, the excessive individual freedom stemming from unregulated 
party autonomy? 
Most of the work in thinking through the content of such a constitutionalism 
will have to be for a future project. But the agenda would be to try to understand 
this particular form of normativity as a sectorial constitutionalism – by looking at 
conflicts constitutionalism as analogous, that is, to, for example, an ‘environmental 
constitutionalism’, or to the idea of a ‘constitution of labour law’. The comparison 
with these alternative partial constitutionalisms – in the plural – seems especially 
useful because they too are simultaneously informed by the classical liberal 
tradition and envision themselves as corrective of some key aspects of that 
tradition. As Douglas Kysar writes with reference to environmental 
constitutionalism, they ‘haunt the liberal vision in just the right way’.58  
One of the ‘improvements to liberal thinking’ that an environmental 
constitutionalism seeks to accomplish, in Kysar’s account, is to force liberalism ‘to 
become more self-conscious of its membership decisions’.59 ‘[N]o liberal political 
community should ever view itself as completed’, Kysar writes. It should 
continuously question ‘whether its vision of harmonious self-ordering could be 
made to be more inclusive’.60 Liberal thought, as complemented by an 
environmental constitutionalism,  
 
should not seek final answers to questions of recognition and membership. 
Instead, it should seek to reinforce collective self-consciousness regarding the 
need to confront those questions and to remain always dissatisfied with their 
instant resolution. […] the most basic of wisdoms remains the implicit 
reminder that how a society acts in its causal capacity – in geopolitical, 
intertemporal, and interspecial terms – will determine the content of its 
identity.61 
                                                     
58 Kysar, Global Environmental Constitutionalism: Getting There from Here, 1 TRANSNAT’L ENV. L. 83, 90 (2012). 
59 Ibid., p. 87.  
60 Ibid., p. 90. Very similar themes figure in writing on labour constitutionalism. The phrase ‘labour’s 
constitution’ commonly refers to constitutional understandings open to contributions from, and the 
interests of, constituencies left out of ‘ordinary’, ‘official’ constitutional processes. See e.g. Pope, Labor’s 
Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 942 (1997); Forbath, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN 
LABOR MOVEMENT (Harvard University Press, 1991). 
61 Kysar (2012), p. 93. See also, e.g., Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes 
About International Law and Globalization, 8 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 9 (2007), 35 (‘The virtue of 
constitutionalism in the international world follows from a […] universalizing focus, allowing extreme 
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Environmental constitutionalism, in this account, emerges as a particularly 
developed instance of a more generic understanding of sectorial 
constitutionalisms: forms of constitutionalist normativity that all, for different 
societal fields, serve to facilitate the articulation of identity and social autonomy, 
and to constitutionalize these fields ‘by generating environmental responsibilities 
in the autonomies themselves’.62  
Private international law, with its wealth of disciplinary experience in 
managing legal pluralism, would have to be a storehouse of ideas on how to 
generate these ‘environmental responsibilities’, and on the relationship between 
external action and internal identity formation.63 It is, for example, precisely this 
capacity for ‘reflexive orientation’, allowing for a ‘deep, persistent, and framing 
awareness of the situatedness of one’s claims’, that Annelise Riles, Karen Knop 
and Ralf Michaels have recently unearthed as part of the distinctive normativity of 
the conflict of laws.64 But classical private international law is also importantly 
incomplete in this respect, for example in the way notions of ‘responsibility’ are 
almost entirely absent from its dominant mode of discourse.65 The agenda for a 
sectorial conflicts constitutionalism would be to bring out and reinforce these 
assorted, but often hidden, experiences and ideas, and to align them with 






One urgent task for a critical conflict-of-laws scholarship is the cultivation of an 
understanding of private international law norms as very different from any 
natural, immutable, background landscape against which modern transnational 
private legal relations play out. Such a move will require conceiving of the field as 
fulfilling constitutional functions, in the allocation of regulatory authority and 
responsibility, and the formation and assertion of political and cultural identity. I 
have argued, however, that in the transnational context, a constitutionalist 
                                                                                                                                       
inequality in the world to be not only shown but also condemned. […] The use of the constitutional 
vocabulary […] transforms individual suffering into an objective wrong that concerns not just the victim, 
but everyone. If calculation is needed, then “all” must be counted as the cost’.). 
62 Teubner (2012), p. 3 (citing Wielsch). ‘Environmental’ is used here in a generic sense. 
63 This is the idea animating work in the vein of ‘constitutional law as private international law’, notably 
that of Christian Joerges, as discussed above in Section II. 
64 Knop, Michaels, Riles, From Multiculturalism to Technique: Feminism, Culture and the Conflict of Laws Style, 64 
STAN. L. REV. 589, 635 (2012). 
65 Bomhoff, The Reach of Rights: ‘The Foreign’ and ‘The Private’ in Conflict of Laws, State Action, and Fundamental-
Rights Cases with Foreign Elements, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, (2008), pp. 69ff; Francq (2005), pp. 584-
585, 594-597, 636-637. 
66 The idea of conflicts constitutionalism as a ‘sectorial’ constitutionalism raises many further questions. 
Private international law is, after all, ‘sectorial’ in a very different sense than are functional fields of law 
like environmental law or labour law. Would a conflicts constitutionalism claim application across the 
board, to all private law relations that cross borders? Or would we have to think of a range of 
differentiated conflicts constitutionalisms for different societal sectors? It is easy to see how clashes 
between these different visions might arise. 
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conception of private international law need not merely refer to principles of 
federal constitutional architecture. It could also express individual communities' 
own commitments to their role in the international, constitutional, ordering of law. 
That, I have suggested, would be the vocation of a local conflicts 
constitutionalism. 
A local conflicts constitutionalism should function to reinforce private 
international law as a site of contestation and deliberation over questions of 
authority, responsibility and identity. Ironically, it is precisely this kind of 
deliberation that a federal-style conflicts constitutionalism tends to inhibit. One of 
the main dangers in the continuing Europeanization of private international law is 
that local – that is: predominantly national – debates on the boundaries and 
responsibilities of polities are stifled, driven out by the as-of-yet rather problematic 
constitutionalism of a an incipient area of freedom, security and justice.67  
The project of thinking about contestation and deliberation in private 
international law is not merely urgent;  it is also, intriguingly, to a large extent 
new. Contemporary private international law still very much rests on foundations 
lain in the early Postwar period. In this modern foundational period, much of its 
principles and doctrines were made subservient to one single, overriding goal: that 
of limiting the power of the state.68 But whereas in one of the other main legal 
constructions of that period - the European integration process - some form of 
recalibration has at least been forcefully debated under the guise of constitutional 
pluralism, no similar process of reflection has yet taken place within private 
international law. Conversations on the scope and content of a constitutionalism 
for the conflict of laws, then, to a large extent, are conversations still to be had. 
This comparison between intellectual trajectories in private international law 
and in other areas of transnational legal ordering is also useful in revealing how we 
may in fact be witnessing some signs of a changing mood. The years since the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis have seen numerous attempts to reassert 
local authority over transnational domains.69 In areas like the fight against 
corruption or tax evasion, local polities, just like 1920s American state legislatures, 
                                                     
67 These problems are especially visible whenever the EU legal sphere interacts with the outside world, 
and so itself acts at a ‘local’ level. The Brussels I Regulation – certainly until the recent 2012 ‘Recast’ – 
showed precious little ‘environmental responsibilities’ towards individuals not domiciled in an EU 
Member State, or to litigation pending in third-state courts, for example. 
68 My colleague Jan Kleinheisterkamp and I explore the intellectual history of private international law in 
this period in a current project on the ‘Postwar Paradigm in Private International Law’. Perhaps the 
clearest example is the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention. On this type of historicity in the conflict 
of laws, see, e.g., Cavers, American Slavery and the Conflict of Laws, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 74 (1971). 
69 See, e.g., the European and US provisions on reporting requirements for payments made to 
governments in the mining (and, in EU law: also forestry) sectors. For the EU, see European Parliament 
Legislative Resolution of 12 June 2013 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council amending Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonization of transparency requirements in 
relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and 
Commission Directive 2007/14/EC, especially Recital 7 and Article 6. For the US see s. 1504 of the 
Dodd Frank Act (s. 13q Securities Exchange Act 1934), and the implementing rule issued by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission on 22 August 2012 (Rule 13q-1). 
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are rediscovering points of ‘touchdown’, as Robert Wai calls them, at which to 
regulate hazardous transnational activities. Without an understanding of private 
international law as a constitutional phenomenon – a phenomenon with the 
capacity to both constitute and limit both local and trans-local autonomy – such 
renewed assertions of public authority over transnational private legal relations will 
remain, in the familiar paradoxical mode that characterizes all constitutionalism, 
both unlikely to be successful, and, if realized, potentially dangerous. 
 
